8 Abstract Language policies are born amidst the complex interplay of social, cul-9 tural, religious and political forces. With this in mind, Bernard Spolsky theorises that 10 the language policy of any independent nation is driven, at its core, by four co-11 occurring conditions-national ideology, English in the globalisation process, a 12 nation's attendant sociolinguistic situation, and the internationally growing interest in 13 the linguistic rights of minorities. He calls for this theory to be tested (Spolsky in 14 Language policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004). This paper accepts 15 the invitation by firstly considering the contributions and limitations of Spolsky's 16 theory vis-à-vis other contemporary research approaches and then applies the theory to 17 the case of Iceland. Iceland is a dynamic locus for this purpose, given its remarkable 18 monodialectism, fervent linguistic purism and protectionism, and history of over-19 whelming homogeneity. The study finds that all Spolsky's factors have in some way 20 driven Icelandic language policy, except in issues of linguistic minority rights. Instead, 21 Icelandic language policy discourse reveals a self-reflexive interest in minority rights 22 whereby Icelandic is discursively positioned as needing protection in the global lan-23 guage ecology. Accordingly, the paper examines how Spolsky's theory may be refined 24 to account for non-rights-based approaches to national language policies. 25 26
120 policy for any independent nation state will reveal the complex interplay of (these) 121 four interdependent but often conflicting factors' (p. 133). The forces may overlap 122 and be interconnected depending on local context and policy realisation, but are 123 nonetheless deemed identifiable as the core motivations. 124
However, in an era in sociolinguistic research that emphasises post-structuralist 125 and localised observations of language, a national language policy theory is not 126 without challenges. Indeed, the field has accepted that language policy is much 127 more than official policy alone because the real language policy situation of a 128 community is realised via the multitude of actors, contexts, processes, interpreta-129 tions, negations and contestations of official policy directives. Accordingly, the 130 ethnography of language policy seeks to replace bureaucracy-oriented research of 131 language policy with bottom-up perspectives that examine community-level 132 engagements with language as a policy phenomenon (Johnson 2013 ) and illustrate 133 the real-life repercussions of policy. Through ethnography the field can engage 134 policy on the ground in order to 'offer a balance between policy power and 135 interpretive agency' and be 'committed to issues of social justice' (Johnson and 136 Ricento 2013: 15) , rather than limiting studies to official discourses. A theory such 137 as Spolsky's does not seem equipped to offer that critical grass-roots perspective.
138
Postmodernism has also extended our focus to observing community-level 139 governance structures that inform how languages are managed (Pennycook 2006) . 140 Indeed, Pennycook (2013) argues that communities' ideologies may be so 141 influential that they regulate language in society beyond official policy. This was 142 indeed the case in Zavala's (2014) research of official Quechua policy where policy 143 objectives are at odds with ideologies of Quechua acquisition. This echoes the 144 contributions to Menken and García (2010) edited book that examine the pertinent 145 role of educators as regulators of language beyond the sphere of governments. 146 Theorising on language policy also assumes a universal understanding of what 147 languages in fact are, and how they can de identified and delineated. Pennycook 148 (2002) presents concerns about the notion of mother tongue, and the sociolinguistic 149 attributes attached to it, as it informs policy. The superdiverse milieu of many 150 communities worldwide has instead drawn attention to the notion of languaging: 151 citizens of linguistically diverse communities may sooner 'employ whatever 152 linguistic features are at their disposal with the intention of achieving their 153 communicative aims' (Jørgensen 2008 : 169) than adhere to traditional notions of 154 mother tongue that a universal language policy theory might rely on. Furthermore, 155 European conceptualisations of language and language vitality that tend to steer 156 policy are indeed just European. In the case of the native American Hopi 157 community, for example, the benevolent ambitions of linguists to teach the language 158 in the public sphere and create dictionaries in fact breached Hopi protocols because 159 traditional beliefs are that documenting and exposing the language to outsiders 160 would 'fix the sounds and meanings of the Hopi language in an alien, objectified 161 form' (Whiteley 2003: 717) .
162
A postmodernist perspective would add that any theory that constitutes a grand 163 narrative should be rejected because it naively seeks to explain language in society 164 universally without regard to local policy contexts. This is reminiscent of 165 Schiffman's view that the real language policy of any given community comprises This tripartite language policy definition can accommodate the multitude of 245 disciplinary perspectives that language policy research demands. It invites, for 246 example, postmodernists to examine how national identity and sociolinguistic 247 situations manifest in, and become contested through, language ideologies and 248 practices. It may also accommodate the work of critical theorists examining the 249 political, ideological and practical manifestations of inter-language power struggles 250 and hegemony. Against Spolsky's national language policy theory, the tripartite 251 definition is a framework for considering societal-level governance, beliefs and The importance of language in Icelandic-ness understandably led to a purist 286 language ideology to preserve an unbroken link to the Golden Age (Friðriksson 287 2009 ). In fact, Icelandic-ness is considered so contingent on the pure form of 288 Icelandic that the language is referred to as the egg of life (Kristmannsson 2004) 289 because 'if the language changes, then the national compact will automatically 290 dissolve' (Hálfdanarson 2005: 56) . There are, however, speculations that the link 291 between national ideology and language ideology may be weakening. Younger 292 Icelanders, who generally support Iceland's economic and political international-293 isation with Europe, are often perceived as less likely to attribute their Icelandic-294 ness to language and heritage (Friðriksson 2009 3 The most discussed change is the so-called dative sickness: a tendency for 322 accusative case objects to be used in the dative (Smith 1994: 675) , but Friðriksson's 323 (2009) study of broader case sicknesses amongst Icelandic children, found that only 324 13.13 % of informants showed any signs of case sickness. Ultimately, the structure 325 of Old Norse has persisted (Kvaran 2003) and Icelanders easily rely on modern 326 Icelandic to read Golden Age literature (Kvaran 2004 Instead, I argue that the current policy framework actually risks initiating 501 language shift away from migrant languages. Minority language maintenance is 502 constrained by legislation that stipulates Icelandic as the only acceptable medium of 503 instruction in compulsory education. Schools are instead tasked to develop and 504 deliver reception plans that ensure immigrant children learn Icelandic (The 505 Compulsory School Act no. 91/2008, Article 16). Where possible, a minority 506 language may be studied as a foreign language instead of a Nordic language (MSA 507 2007), however Statistics Iceland (2012) has not reported any students recently 508 studying Polish or Lithuanian (the largest minorities). Secondly, as May (2006) 509 would predict, the generally hegemonic bias of the policy framework, and the Spolsky's notion that governments are necessarily interested in attending to and 515 affording positive language rights is, therefore, problematic. It seems, at least in the 516 case of Iceland, that it turns a blind-eye to linguistic hegemony and assumes 517 democratic and inclusive policy making. Indeed, nations with hegemonic cultural 518 political agendas, such as for the purposes of unity, may be less likely to afford 519 linguistic rights to minorities. Spolsky (2004) himself has referred to Oman, Saudi 520 Arabia, Portugal and Turkey as examples of 'monolingual countries with 521 marginalised minorities' (p. 139-142) which seemingly fall into a similar camp 522 as Iceland. Réaume and Pinto's (2012) discussions are especially useful. To their 523 theorising, non-rights-based approaches to managing language diversity especially 524 emerge where diversity is seen as a threat rather than an opportunity (p. 39). In such 525 cases, governments may engage the language rights question but decide to deny 526 language rights on the basis of local socio-political interests than to grant them, and 527 this is indeed evident in Iceland. Therefore, the question under Spolsky's framework 528 of how language rights inform national language policies has assumed a positive 529 interest in linguistic rights which is not a universally default position. 530
However, in the case of Iceland an interest in linguistic rights nonetheless informs 531 language policy, but in a way that is self-reflexive and not as Spolsky envisaged. 532 Rather than attending to domestic minorities, Icelandic policy and discourse 533 frequently position the Icelandic language itself as an international relative minority 534 requiring protection. This paper has already described a recurring theme of 535 encroaching language majorities and other perceived threats motivating Icelandic 536 language management. However, Icelandic was most illustratively framed as a 537 minority when the government mounted a battle against Microsoft which had refused 538 to develop Icelandic-language software. Iceland viewed this as a disastrous imposition 539 of supranational language policy on a minority (Holmarsdottir 2001) . Academic 540 literature also tends to frame Icelandic as minoritised: for example, Holmarsdottir 541 (2001) groups Iceland with minorities that 'suffer stigmatisation as a result of the 542 removal of the language from areas of social, economic and political power' (p. 391), 543 and Hilmarsson-Dunn (2006) proposes that 'Icelandic requires continued strong 544 support from the state and a positive attitude from its citizens to prevent it succumbing 545 to market pressures' (p. 309). This, however, is usefully contrasted with Svavarsdót-546 tir's (2008) pragmatic argument that Icelandic, as the overwhelmingly predominant 547 language of Icelanders with a standardised form and strong literary tradition, is 548 undeniably a majority language. She argues that 'there is no obvious justification for 549 this feeling of an external threat to the language in present times' (p. 455). 564 not yet informed Iceland's current language policy. The hegemony of official policy 565 and absence of minority language rights even risks initiating language shift within 566 immigrant communities. The only interest in linguistic rights seems self-reflexive in 567 that policy and discourse attend to the vulnerability of Icelandic as an international 568 minority struggling in the global language ecology. 569 It therefore seems that Spolsky's theory does not account for non-rights based 570 approaches to national language policy such as Iceland's. Whereas Spolsky 571 envisaged increasingly sympathetic responses to minority groups, the Icelandic 572 situation sooner sees domestic linguistic diversity as a threat. However, rather than 573 removing an interest in linguistics rights as the fourth component of Spolsky's 574 theory, I suggest its coverage be expanded: instead of this component seeing nations 575 as necessarily adopting positive stances on minority rights, it could be seen as a 576 political domain which nations are increasingly required to engage in some way, 577 whether the results are permissive, silent towards, or restrictive for the minorities 578 concerned. Although Iceland has not advanced linguistic rights for its minorities as 579 Spolsky envisaged, it has nonetheless engaged that question: it chose to advance 580 rights for itself on the international stage, but not for its own sizeable Polish and 581 Lithuanian communities. As such, seeing this final factor as an area of engagement 582 means it can account for various political responses to the notion of linguistic rights, 583 or even apply this interest self-reflexively as Iceland has.
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The activity of applying Spolsky's theory has also shown it is not positioned to 585 trace the practical journeys and experiences of official language policy through its 586 many layers, agents and process from the bureaucracy down to the individual. Even 587 when using Spolsky's own tripartite language policy definition to include language 588 beliefs and language practices as policy, the theory's focus at the national level 589 means it misses the locally contextualised community-level contestations, appro-590 priations and negotiations that impact on the actual realisation of policy. However, I 591 hasten to add that while postmodernist, ethnographic and multi-layered approaches 592 to language policy that can conduct such research are important, it is also still very 593 valuable to examine how and why governments arrive at particular language policy 594 solutions. Indeed, this is the genesis of change that can ultimately background and 595 even necessitate community-level research vis-à-vis national policy directives. 596 Rather than seeing Spolsky's theory as too focussed on the macro at the expense of 597 the micro, I see his theory as only better equipping scholarship to contextualise any 598 grassroots language policy situation or discourse that is positioned against or 
